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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to provide an economic analysis of the relationship between eco-
nomic integration and political fragmentation. This follows previous contributions from Alesina,
Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), Casella (2001), Casella and Feinstein (2002) or Leite-Monteiro
and Sato (2003). We go a step further than these authors by assuming that economic integra-
tion and political fragmentation are both decided by a majority vote. As them, we observe that
economic integration involves political fragmentation. But, we establish also that economic in-
tegration might be sometimes deterred by the majority to prevent political fragmentation from
happening.
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1 Introduction
In recent times independantist movements have appeared in some countries such as in
Spain, Belgium or Canada and further regional autonomy has been demanded for example
in Scotland or Catalogna. Nation-State seems today to be threatened. At the same
time markets became worldwide. These two trends have brought some authors to study
the relationship between economic integration and political fragmentation. Theoretical
literature appears divided on this issue. On one hand, some authors in particular in
political science as Young (1995) consider that diﬀerent degrees of economic integration
are compatible with diﬀerent institutional rules as voluntary harmonization, consultative
organisms, international negociations, legislative or executive instances... This author
concludes then that there is no relation between economic and political integration. On the
other hand, economic literature has recognized early the link between these two processes.
For instance, List conceived two centuries ago customs union as a first step towards the
building of the German State.1
More recently, a literature has been built on the original analysis by Buchanan and
Faith (1987) of the possibility of ‘internal exit’ through secession. Unfortunately, the
eﬀects of economic integration on the cost of secession are not studied in this seminal ar-
ticle, since the authors consider incorrectly individual incomes as exogenous.2 Following
the works of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) or Bolton and Roland (1997) on political frag-
mentation,3 Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), Casella (2001) and Leite-Monteiro
and Sato (2003) focus explicitly on the relationship between economic integration and
political integration. On one hand, Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) assume a
production economy where every agent owns a specific input to produce the final good.
The cost of heterogeneity increases with the size of the country. For these authors, inter-
1 Zollverein was established in 1834, monetary union came in 1857, and the German empire was
instituted in 1871.
2 See Rota Graziosi (2006) for a corrected version of their framework.
3 Alesina and Spolaore (1997) extend their initial model in order to take into account the eﬀects of
economic integration. They assume a productivity factor, human capital, which is increasing in the size
of the country and in the openess of its frontiers. When economic integration is achieved, individual
incomes depend exclusively on a worldwide level of human capital, reducing then economic advantage of
large nations (see also the chapter in Alesina and Spolaore (2003) on this issue).
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national trade liberalization improves individual income but reduces optimal country size.
Casella (2001) obtains a similar result by developing a model of coalition formation. The
author establishes that the optimal number of coalitions rises with the size of the market.
These two first articles conclude unambiguously that trade openness favors secessions or
at least political decentralization. On the other hand, Casella and Feinstein (2002) and
Leite-Monteiro and Sato (2003) establish a non monotone relationship between economic
integration and political one. Casella and Feinstein (2002) show that individuals prefer
political separation into diﬀerent jurisdictions for smaller or larger size of market. Fo-
cusing on incomes redistribution, Leite-Monteiro and Sato (2003) use a model of fiscal
competition and find that the incentives of political separation are decreasing and then
increasing in the capital mobility costs.
In the line of these preceding articles, we examine the interactions between economic
integration and political fragmentation. However, all the above quoted authors consider
as exogenous the change of economic integration, which might resut from a decrease in
the capital mobility costs or from an increase in the market size.4 The main originality
of our work is to consider that economic integration and politic disintegration are both
collectively determined through a simple majority vote. If we admit as Alesina, Spolaore,
and Wacziarg (2000) or Casella (2001) that economic integration involves political disin-
tegration, we wonder here if an opposition to economic openness would emerge motivated
by the fear of secession. In other words, the political consequences of economic integration
might be such that autarky, or in a more moderate way some protectionist barriers, would
be choosen even if it means a lower private income for a majority of agents in order to
maintain the political unity of the country and to insure a more advantageous provision
of national public goods.
Following Casella (2001) or Casella and Feinstein (2002), we use the model of Salop
(1979), which conforms to the more realistic formulation of diﬀerentiation from Hotelling
4 In their working paper version, Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (1997) study the endogeneity
of economic integration, by assuming that trade barriers are a function of country size in a world of
symmetric countries. In Casella and Feinstein (2002), the size of markets which captures the degree of
economic integration results from individual decisions. Neither in Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (1997)
nor in Casella and Feinstein (2002), economic integration is decided by vote.
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or Lancaster.5 The heterogenity of the population is characterised by a circle and we
consider every national government as a local public good. Following Casella (1994),
Casella (2001) or Casella and Feinstein (2002), individual incomes result from exchanges
between traders. There are two types of market: one national and one international.
For the purpose of this paper, we examine only two polar cases: autarky, as set againts
complete economic integration. In autarky the market is only national and individual
revenue results from the unique domestic market. Economic integration allows agents to
participate within the international market. We conclude that autarky might be prefered
when the productivity on the international market is insuﬃciently low with respect to the
productivity on the domestic one.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the framework and
the useful assumptions; in section 3 we define critical value of parameters for political
fragmentation; section 4 examines the consequences of economic integration; section 5
concludes.
2 The framework
We present initially the setup of the studied game. Then, we describe our world represen-
tation, the individual incomes formalization and we deduce the individual preferences.
2.1 The Setup of the game
We consider a three-stage game. We adopt the following timing for decision making:
• stage 1: inhabitants vote for the degree of trade openness;
• stage 2: a vote in the studied peripheral region determines or not if secession occurs;
5 Krugman (1989) writes :
“The Hotelling-Lancaster formulation has the advantage of greater realism, and leads to
somewhat more plausible formulation of the nature of the gains from trade. However, it
is quite diﬃcult to work with. The Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz approach, by contrast, while less
convincing, lends itself quite easily to modelling.”
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• stage 3: inhabitants of the relevant jurisdiction choose the location of the unique
public good.
This sequence of decision allows us to go a step further than the analysis of Alesina,
Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000). By applying backward induction, we are then able to
consider the political consequences of trade openness on the country unity. Following
Buchanan and Faith (1987) or Bolton and Roland (1997), we admit in the second step
regional autodetermination principle: a region can become unilaterally independant. The
game ends by the vote of the location of the unique public good in the relevant jurisdiction.
Democracy is here direct. There is neither information asymmetry between those who
govern and those who are governed nor lobbying groups which would influence rulers.
2.2 World representation
We represent population heterogeneity by a circle with a unitary radius. For every agent
there is a corresponding angle, denoted by x (x ∈ [0, 2π]). By assumption, individuals are
uniformly distributed along the circle, their total population is 2π. The world is shared
in n countries (indexed by i). Each country (i) is composed of mi regions. Following
Bolton and Roland (1997), we assume a fixed partition of the world, borders are his-
torically determined. In others words, national borders (bi−1 and bi for the country i,
i = 1, ..., n) and regional borders (aij−1 and aij for region j of country i, j = 1, ...,mi) are
exogeneous. These assumptions constrast with Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) in
which secession is choosen by unanimity. We suppose: b0 = a10 = bn = anmn = 0.
Insert Figure 1
For tractability, we limit countries size to π. There exist at least two countries in the
world, moreover we restrict our analysis to peripheric regions. This kind of regions is
defined here by an international border, shared with the “host” country. Besides their
size are supposed relatively small. More accurately, we study the behaviour of country 1
and its region 1. Their respective sizes are denoted by: s1 = b for country 1 and s11 = a
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for region 1, with by assumption a < b
2
. In the rest of the paper, we will focus only on
individuals located between 0 and b.
By assumption, agents are immobile. There exist no fiscal competition between the
countries. In an European context, this hypothesis might be justified by the high level of
mobility costs induced by imperfections on the job market or on the real-estate market
(see Faini, Galli, Gennari, and Rossi (1997) for an empirical study on this issue). Another
justification is cultural particularisms which reduce interregional mobility. The assump-
tion of individual immobility corresponds to the exogeneity of individual preferences too,
which is essential for the spatial model of voting (see Hinich and Merrill (1984)).
2.3 Individual incomes
Every agent is initialy endowed with two units of a specific good. As Casella (2001)
or Casella and Feinstein (2002), this dotation is not productive in itself. Income results
from a commercial matching between agents. There are two matches for each agent. The
income of the individual x is given by:
w (b, β;x) = (1 + β)wd (b;x) + (1− β)we (b;x) ,
where wd (b;x) and we (b;x) are respectively the individual incomes on national and in-
ternational market. The parameter β measures the level of country economic integration:
β = 1 involves autarky; β = 0 means complete economic integration. The degree of open-
ness or of protectionism (β) results from a majority vote at the first step of the game.
We do not consider international negociations on β. Moreover, there is no trade retalia-
tions among the new created countries in case of secession. Thus, in autarky individuals
trade only on the domestic (or national) market. With complete economic integration one
match is held in the national market, the other in the international market.
We assume a transaction cost increasing in the distance between two commmercial
partners. An agent (x) knows exaclty her location on the circle but she ignores the place
of her commercial partner, denoted by v. Thus, the net gain of their transactions is
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uncertain. Each agent is only aware on which market they trade. So, she knows if her
commercial partner, denoted by v, leaves her country (v ∈ [0, b]) or if she is a foreigner
(v /∈ [0, b]). The individual income on the domestic market is given by:
wd (b;x) = ωdb (1−E [d (x, v) |v ∈ [0, b] ]) , (1)
where ωd evaluates the productivity of the domestic market. A similar argument defines
individual income on the international market, denoted by we (b;x). The size of this
market is 2π − b and ωe is its productivity. We have:
we (b;x) = ωe (2π − b) (1− E [d (x, v) |v /∈ [0, b] ]) , (2)
Moreover, we assume that:
ωe > ωd > 0. (3)
For a given distance between two trading partners, international exchanges are more pro-
ductive that domestic ones. This hypothesis creates an individual incitation to economic
integration. We consider a quadratic normalized distance (d(x, v) =
¡
x−v
π
¢2
). Since we
assume a uniform distribution along the circle, the expected value of distance on the two
markets (domestic and interntional) yields to:6
E [d (x, v) |v ∈ [0, b] ] =
bZ
0
1
b
µ
x− v
π
¶2
dv,
E [d (x, v) |v /∈ [0, b] ] = p (v ∈ [−π + x, 0])E [d (x, v) |v ∈ [−π + x, 0]]
+p (v ∈ [b, x+ π])E [d (x, v) |v ∈ [b, x+ π] ] ,
where p (v ∈ [−π + x, 0]) = π−x
2π−b and p (v ∈ [b, x+ π]) =
π+x−b
2π−b . In Appendix A.1, we
6 Given the assumptions of our model, we notice that the individual income is symmetric with respect
to b2 :
∀ε ∈
∙
0,
b
2
¸
, w
µ
b, β;
b
2
− ε
¶
= w
µ
b, β;
b
2
+ ε
¶
(4)
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establish that domestic individual revenues are increasing with the size of the country (see
relation (17)), while international ones are decreasing (see expression (18)). We highlight
an advantage to large countries when tariﬀ barriers are high and a greater incentive to
openness when the country is small. Our assumptions yield to the same result as Alesina,
Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000).
However, in contrast to Casella (1994), Casella (2001) or Casella and Feinstein (2002),
our incomes formulation is such that optimal distance between two traders is nil. For
an identical productivity of domestic and international exchanges, people prefers to trade
with their immediate neighbours than with more distant agents. Inhabitants leaving close
to the center of the country (b/2) have then the highest domestic market incomes, whilst
their international market incomes are lowest. Our assumption induces an incitative for
inhabitants in peripheral regions to support economic integration.
The variations of the whole individual revenue (w (b, β;x)) with respect to the size of
the country (b) and its openness are then given by:
∂w (b, β;x)
∂b
=
Ã
1− (b− x)
2
π2
!£
(1 + β)ωd − (1− β)ωe
¤
. (5)
We deduce that:
∂w (b, β;x)
∂b
> 0⇔ β > ω
e − ωd
ωe + ωd
or equivalently
ωd
ωe
>
1− β
1 + β
= ωc1 (β) . (6)
Under condition (3), the size of the country increases individual income if and only if
openness is suﬃciently low (or β suﬃciently high). Moreover, we note that under au-
tarky, the income is obviously increasing in the size of the country
³
∂w(b,1;x)
∂b > 0
´
. If
we consider the variation of individual income with respect to openness (β), we have:
∂w(b,β;x)
∂β = w
d (b;x)− we (b;x). Given the assumptions of our framework, it appears that
each individual would be in favor of free trade (β = 0) as soon as international incomes
exceed domestic ones. However, this result does not take into account the consequences
of economic integration over political unity, and then over the national policies. More-
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over, we notice that: ∂
2w(b,β;x)
∂b∂β =
³
1− (b−x)
2
π2
´ ¡
ωd + ωe
¢
> 0. More protectionnist is the
country, more important will be the eﬀect of its size on individual incomes. In other
words, openness and country size appear here as strategic complements. Finally, under
our assumptions, we observe that economic integration reduces individual incomes in-
equalities.7 Incomes are even equal when economic integration is complete (β = 0) and
the productivity parameters identical (ωd = ωe).
2.4 Preferences
As Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997), we suppose that private
and public goods are substitute. All individuals have the same preferences summarized in
the utility function of agent (x): υ (cp, cb;x) = cp (x) + cb (x), where cp (x) is private con-
sumption and cb (x) public consumption. Individuals consume all their revenues. Private
consumption is then equal to available income:
cp(x) = Cp (t, b, w;x) = (1− t)w (b, β;x) , (7)
where t is the uniform tax rate.
Every country is represented by an unique public good called government, a term
which we identify a group of administrative, judicial and economic services. Following
Tiebout (1956), we suppose the public good locally produced in a single place, the capital
(y ∈ [0, b]). As Alesina and Spolaore (1997), we assume the individual utility of the public
good as decreasing with the distance from their ideal point, their place on the circle. Thus,
public consumption is given by:
cb(x) = Cb (y, g, b;x) = g (1− d (x, y)) ,
where g is the maximum individual utility of the public good, when d (x, y) = 0. As
Buchanan and Faith (1987) or Alesina and Spolaore (1997), public good quantity is fixed.
7 This result can be related to the empirical works of Lindert and Williamson (2001).
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Its cost is constant, equal to K. This assumption involves some scale economies in the
furniture of public good, which yields to a centripetal force in opposition to the centrifugal
force, due to the population heterogenity. Moreover, to keep the model workable we
assume: K = bg. Balanced budget constraint yields to: K = btw (b, β), where w (b, β) is
the average income, equal to:8
w (b, β) ≡ 1
b
bZ
0
£
(1 + β)wd (b;x) + (1− β)we (b;x)
¤
dx. (8)
We deduce that the tax rate is equal to:
t (b, β) =
g
w (b, β)
. (9)
Diﬀerentiating the tax rate with respect to the country size (b) yields to:
∂t (b, β)
∂b
= − g
w (b, β)2
µ
∂w (b, β)
∂b
¶
.
We establish that the tax rate decreases with the size of the country if the relative pro-
ductivity of international exchanges is suﬃciently high (see expression (24) in Appendix
A.1):
∂t (b, β)
∂b
< 0⇔ ∂w (b, β)
∂b
> 0⇔ ω
d
ωe
>
1− β
1 + β
≡ ωc1 (β) , (10)
and
∂t (b, β)
∂β
> 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
>
8π3
6bπ2 − b3 − 1 = ω
c
2 (b) . (11)
The tax burden increases in the degree of trade barriers (β) if and only if the relative
productivity of international exchanges is insuﬃciently low.9
8 We notice that the mean income is always increasing in the trade openness (decreasing in β).
9 Owing to the tax rate (t) belongs to the intervall [0, 1], we have an additional condition on the level
of g, which we will assume respected in the rest of the paper: g < g (b, β) = bw (b, β) .
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3 Equilibrium determination
We turn now to the resolution of our game. Applying backward inducion, we first deter-
mine the location of the public good, then we establish if secession occurs or not and we
end by determining the voted degree of trade openness.
3.1 Public good location
Applying backward induction, we consider now the third stage of the game: the location
of the public good, in other terms the capital place, denoted by y. Under condition (9),
the indirect utility function is given by:
V (y, b, g, β;x) = (1− t (b, β))w(b, β;x) + g (1− d (x, y))
The choice of the capital for individual x is then given by the following maximization
program: y∗ (x) ≡ argmax
y∈[0,b]
V (y, b, g, β;x). The First Order Condition (FOC) involves:
y∗ (x) = x. The concavity of V (.) with respect to y allows us to determine the Con-
dorcet winner (yM) by applying the Median Voter Theorem.10 We deduce that: yM = b
2
.
After substituting y by its equilibrium value, the indirect utility function, denoted by
U (b, g, β;x), is then given by:
U (b, g, β;x) = (1− t (b, β))w(b, β;x) + g
µ
1− d
µ
x,
b
2
¶¶
(12)
The population heterogeneity is double. Indeed, agents diﬀerentiate not only by their
private incomes (as in Bolton and Roland (1997)), but also by their appreciation of the
public good (as in Alesina and Spolaore (1997)). However, following Bolton, Roland, and
Spolaore (1996), our formulation reduces population heterogeneity to one dimension: the
individual place on the circle.
10 The conditions of unidimensionality and unimodality are respected.
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3.2 Political fragmentation or not
We now describe the second stage of the game, in which voters choose regional indepen-
dance or not. We apply the same argument as in the preceding section when region 1
([0, a]) becomes independant.11 With independance the capital moves from b/2 to a/2
in the center of the region 1, so y∗ = a
2
. The indirect utility of an inhabitant (x) of the
region 1 turns into:
U (a, g, β;x) = (1− t (a, β))w(a, β;x) + g
³
1− d
³
x,
a
2
´´
.
For tractability, we assume that the rest of country 1 remains close after the secession of
region 1. So the new capital locates in a+b
2
and the size of this new country is b− a. The
utility function of individual x located between a and b is then given by:
U (b− a, g, β;x) = (1− t (b− a, β))w(b− a, β;x) + g
µ
1− d
µ
x,
a+ b
2
¶¶
.
In order to determine when the secession occurs, we define a function, denoted byD (a, b, g, β;x),
which is the diﬀerence in utility terms between the two political status (separation and
union) for individual x. We have:
D (a, b, g, β;x) = U (a, g, β;x)− U (b, g, β;x) .
An appropriate decomposition of D (a, b, g, β;x) allows us to capture three distinct eﬀects
of secession:
D (a, b, g, β;x) = (1− t (b, β)) (w (a, β;x)− w (b, β;x))| {z }
EI(a,b,β;x)
+ w (a, β;x) (t (b, β)− t (a, β))| {z }
EF (a,b,β;x)
+g
µ
d
µ
x,
b
2
¶
− d
³
x,
a
2
´¶
| {z }
EP (a,b;x)
11 The condition of non-negativity of the tax rate changes into: g < g (a, β) = aw (a, β) .
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Indeed, we distinguish:
• An income eﬀect, denoted by EI (a, b, β;x): individual domestic incomes increase
with the size of the country, whilst individual international incomes decrease. The
result remains ambiguous and depends on ω
e
ωd (≷ ωc1 (β)). More formally, we know
from (6) that:
if β >
ωe − ωd
ωe + ωd
or equivalently if
ωd
ωe
> ωc1 (β) , then E
I (a, b, β;x) < 0. (13)
• A fiscal eﬀect (EF (a, b, β;x)): the assumption of a fixed quantity of public good
involves a rising of the taxes when the fiscal base contracts with secession. Expression
(10) yields to:
if β >
ωe − ωd
ωe + ωd
or equivalently if
ωd
ωe
> ωc1 (β) , then E
F (a, b, β;x) < 0. (14)
• A political eﬀect (EP (a, b;x)): this outcome results from the move of the capital
and depends on the location of the individual (x). We remark that this eﬀect is not
aﬀected by the openness of the country (β). We have:
x ∈
£
0,min
©
a+b
4
, a
ª¤
, EP (a, b;x) > 0,
x ∈
£
min
©
a+b
4
, a
ª
,max
©
a+b
4
, a
ª¤
, EP (a, b;x) 6 0.
(15)
If a < b/3,12 secession provide to all inhabitants of region 1 a policy more satisfactory¡
EP (a, b;x) > 0
¢
.
By the first eﬀect, we emphasize that political fragmentation has an impact on private
individual incomes. This link was ignored by Buchanan and Faith (1987). However,
while in the corrected version of Buchanan and Faith (1987)13 secession always involves
a decrease in private income as in Bolton and Roland (1997), we have here an ambiguous
12 For a < b/3, we have: a < a+b4 or equivalently d
¡
a, a2
¢
< d
¡
a, b2
¢
.
13 See Rota Graziosi (2006).
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relation between political fragmentation and individual incomes due to the eﬀects of
international trade. The second and third eﬀects yield to a similar trade-oﬀ as developped
by Alesina and Spolaore (1997). The heterogenity of the population in the consumption
of public good acts as a centrifugal force, while the scale economies in the provision of
this public good involves a centripetal force. The sum of these three eﬀects induces then
the regional majority to choose the independance or not.
In order to highlight the combinaison of the three eﬀects, we focus on the two polar
cases: autarky (β = 1) and complete integration (β = 0). In autarky, agents based near
the border are not only the poorest, but they benefit the least from the public good. We
remark that the assumption of an uniform tax involves a positive relationship between
individual income and fiscal obligations, thus a negative link between taxes and the dis-
tance from the capital. This eﬀect mitigates the centrifugal force due to the heterogeneity
of the population. We deduce a first result
Lemma 1 No secession occurs in autarky (D (a, b, g, 1;x) < 0).
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
In autarky (β = 1) political fragmentation always involves a reduction of the individual
income (EI (a, b, β;x) < 0). Combined with the rise of the taxation (EF (a, b, β;x) <
0) this outcome exceeds the possible advantage of separation, i.e. a closer government
(EP (a, b;x) > 0). Thus autarky insures here political stability.
We consider now the situation in complete economic integration (β = 0). From (13),
(14) and (15), we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Free trade involves secession.
Proof: since we have assumed ωe > ωd, conditions (13) and (14) yield toEI (a, b, 0;x) >
0 and EF (a, b, 0;x) > 0. For a majority at least of inhabitants in region 1 (
£
0, a
2
¤
), we
observe that the political eﬀect is positive: EP (a, b, 0;x) > 0. Since the two others eﬀects
are favorable too, independance is unilaterally wished by a majority of region 1.
A suﬃcient condition under which economic integration favors policital fragmentation
is that the productivity of international exchanges are greater than this of domestic ones
(ωe > ωd). As Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000)
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and Casella (2001) we show that economic integration reduces the cost of the regional
independance and allows secession.
3.3 Which degree of trade openness
We now turn to the last stage of the game by considering the choice of trade openness.
The maximization program of each individual utility level with respect to trade openness
is given by:
∀x ∈ [0, a] , β∗ (x) ≡ argmax
β∈[0,1]
(max {U (b, g, β;x) , U (a, g, β;x)})
∀x ∈ [a, b] , β∗ (x) ≡ argmax
β∈[0,1]
(max {U (b, g, β;x) , U (b− a, g, β;x)})
(16)
The discontinuity of the objective functions does not allow us to establish an explicit
solution of this program. We restrict ourselves to determine suﬃcient conditions that
yield to unambiguous conclusions. We focus then on corner solutions of β (= 0, 1), which
corresponds to free trade or autarky. If the FOC of (16) is strictly negative (positive),
then individual located at x will be in favor of free trade (autarky), even if free trade
involves political fragmentation. We obtain the following proposition :
Proposition 1 Under our assumptions, we observe that:
(i) a majority in country 1 will choose economic integration, which involves political frag-
mentation, if the following suﬃcient condition holds:
ωd
ωe
< ωc3 (b) ,
(ii) a majority in country 1 will choose autarky, and then political union remains, if the
following suﬃcient condition holds:
ωd
ωe
> ωc2 (a) .
Proof: see Appendix A.3.
Economic integration is not systematically choosen. Indeed, the relative productivity
of the international trade must be suﬃciently high (ωe > ωd/ωc3 (b)). We do not examine
individual preferences when the ratio ωd/ωe varies between ωc3 (b) and ωc2 (a). However,
14
we illustrate our results in the following Figure.
Insert Figure 2
In this Figure, we represent the utility levels of four critical inhabitants, respectively
located at x = 0, a, a+b
2
and b, when trade openness (β) varies from 0 to 0.4. Since the
individual utility level depends on the occurence of secession, the curves are kinked in β.
Indeed, there exists a critical value of βc (x), for which individual x prefers secession to
political unity. If the country is suﬃciently large (b = 4π/5) as in the first graphic of
Figure 2, we notice that all curves are decreasing in β. This illustrates the situation where
inhabitants vote for free trade and secession occurs. In the second graphic of Figure 2, we
highlight a possible conflict among country inhabitants. Indeed, while individuals located
close to the borders (x = 0 or b) wish free trade in order to reduce the cost of secession,
others inhabitants located close to country center (x = b/2 or (a+ b) /2) support autarky.
It appears then that the initial conditions concerning trade openness matter.
The second set of graphics represents the utility levels of inhabitants for diﬀerent value
of trade openness.
Insert Figure 3
The gray curve is the utility level when the country remains united, while the black one
represents the utility level in case of regional secession. We consider four critical values
of β (respectively 0, 0.32, 0.335 and 1). The top-left graphic is an illustration of Lemma
1 and corresponds to the autarky case (β = 1). We observe that the black curve is
always below the gray one: all country inhabitants prefer political union to secession
under autarky. Similarly, the top-right graphic provides an example of Lemma 2. Under
complete economic integration (β = 0), the black curves are always above the gray one,
which means that all inhabitants prefer secession under free trade. The two last graphics
(β = 0.32 or 0.335) show a potential conflict among country inhabitants. Two distinct
groups emerge: one in favor of political unity is composed by individuals leaving close to
15
the center; the other which supports secession leaves in the peripheral areas. If this last
group has the majority in the region, then political separation occurs.
4 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to examine the interaction between economic integra-
tion and political fragmentation. As Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina, Spolaore, and
Wacziarg (2000) or Casella and Feinstein (2002), we have established that the openness of
trade barriers allows secession. But owing to this relation, autarky is sometimes preferred
to economic integration by a majority of voters, in order to keep the political unity of the
country.
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A Appendix
A.1 Diﬀerentiations and analytical expressions
Expression (1) is equal to:
wd (b;x) =
ωdb
3π2
¡
3π2 − b2 + 3bx− 3x2
¢
.
From (1), we deduce that:
∂wd (b;x)
∂b
= ωd
µ
1− b
2
2π2
¶
> 0. (17)
Expression (2) is equivalent to:
we (b;x) =
ωeb
¡
4π3 − 3π2b+ b3 − 3b2x+ 3bx2
¢
6π2 (2π − b) .
It yields to:
∂we (b;x)
∂b
= −ωe
µ
1− b
2
2π2
¶
< 0. (18)
Individual income is then given by:
w (b, β;x) =
b
¡
3π2 − b2 + 3x (b− x)
¢
(1 + β)ωd +
¡
4π3 + b3 − 3b
¡
π2 − x2 + bx
¢¢
(1− β)ωe
3π2
.
We have:
∂w (b, β;x)
∂β
=
b
¡
3π2 − b2 + 3x (b− x)
¢
ωd −
¡
4π3 + b3 − 3b
¡
π2 − x2 + bx
¢¢
ωe
3π2
, (19)
and
∂2w (b, β;x)
∂β∂x
=
b (b− 2x)
¡
ωd + ωe
¢
π2
≷ 0⇔ x ≶ b
2
. (20)
which allows us to establish that:
∂w
¡
b, β; b2
¢
∂β
> ∂w (b, β;x)
∂β
> ∂w (b, β; b)
∂β
=
∂w (b, β; 0)
∂β
. (21)
The diﬀerentiations of the mean individual income with respect to the size and the trade openness are
given by:
∂w (b, β)
∂b
=
∙
1− b
2
2π2
¸ £
(1 + β)ωd − (1− β)ωe
¤
, (22)
and
∂w (b, β)
∂β
= −
8π3ωe +
¡
b3 − 6bπ2
¢ ¡
ωd + ωe
¢
6π2
. (23)
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The tax rate given by (9) is also equivalent to:
t (b, β) =
6π2g
ωd (1 + β) b (6π2 − b2) + ωe (1− β) (8π3 − 6π2b+ b3)
We have:
∂t (b, β)
∂b
= −
18gπ2
¡
2π2 − b
¢2 £
(1 + β)ωd − (1− β)ωe
¤
b2 [−b (6π2 − b2) (1 + β)ωd − (b3 − 6bπ2 + 8π3) (1− β)ωe]2
, (24)
and
∂t (b, β)
∂β
=
6π2g
£
8π3ωe − b
¡
6π2 − b2
¢ ¡
ωd + ωe
¢¤
[−b (6π2 − b2) (1 + β)ωd − (b3 − 6bπ2 + 8π3) (1− β)ωe]2
, (25)
from which we deduce relations (11) and (11).
We note that
∂EI (a, b, β;x)
∂x
= −(b− a) (a+ b− 2x)
π2
(1− t (b, β))
£
(1 + β)ωd − (1− β)ωe
¤
, (26)
∂EF (a, b, β;x)
∂x
= −a (a− 2x)
π2
(t (a, β)− t (b, β))
£
(1 + β)ωd − (1− β)ωe
¤
, (27)
∂EP (a, b;x)
∂x
=
g (a− b)
π2
< 0. (28)
A.2 Secession in autarky
We have:
EF (a, b, 1;x) < 0 and EI (a, b, 1;x) < 0.
Since we focus on a small peripheral region of country 1, we have assumed a < b/2. Thus we have:
a+ b− 2x > 0, ∀x ∈ [0, a]. From (26), (27) and (28) we deduce that
∂EI (a, b, 1;x)
∂x
= −2 (b− a) (a+ b− 2x)
π2
(1− t (b, 1))ωd < 0,
∂EF (a, b, 1;x)
∂x
= −2a (a− 2x)
π2
(t (a, 1)− t (b, 1))ωd > 0,
∂EP (a, b;x)
∂x
=
g (a− b)
π2
< 0.
Thus, ∀x ∈ [0, a]
D (a, b, g, 1;x) = EI (a, b, 1;x) +EF (a, b, 1;x) + EP (a, b;x)
< EI (a, b, 1; 0) +EF (a, b, 1; a) +EP (a, b; 0)
< EF (a, b, 1; a) +EP (a, b; 0)
where
EF (a, b, 1; a) = 2a
¡
3π2 − a2
¢
g
µ
1
b (6π2 − b2) −
1
a (6π2 − a2)
¶
EP (a, b; 0) =
g
4π2
¡
b2 − a2
¢
.
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Since by defintion 0 6 a 6 b2 , we have:
EF (a, b, 1; a) 6 g b
2
µ
3π2 − b
2
4
¶Ã
1
b (6π2 − b2) −
1
b
2
¡
6π2 − b24
¢!
= −g
2
³
3π2 − b24
´¡
6π2 − 34b2
¢¡
6π2 − b24
¢
(6π2 − b2)
6 −g
4
6π2 − 34b2
6π2 − b2
EP
µ
b
2
, b; 0
¶
6 EP (a, b; 0) 6 EP (0, b; 0) = g
4π2
b2 6 g
4
Thus, we deduce:
EF (a, b, 1; a) +EP (a, b; 0) 6 − g
16
µ
b2
6π2 − b2
¶
< 0⇔ D (a, b, g, 1;x) < 0.
A.3 Trade openness
Since the utility function is discontinuous due to the possible secession, we are not able to solve explicitly
the maximization progam (16). We restrict our analysis to define only suﬃcient conditions for free
trade or for autarky. We consider first the case where economic integration does not involve secession.
Diﬀerentiating U (b, g, β;x) with respect to β yields to:
∂U (b, g, β;x)
∂β
= −∂t (b, β)
∂β
w (b, β;x) + (1− t (b, β)) ∂w (b, β;x)
∂β
,
The symmetry of w (b, β;x) with respect to b2 involves that: for x ∈ [0, b],
∂U
µ
b, g, β;
b
2
¶
/∂β > ∂U (b, g, β;x) /∂β > ∂U (b, g, β; 0) /∂β.
First, we focus on the sign of ∂t (b, β) /∂β, ∂t (a, β) /∂β and ∂t (b− a, β) /∂β. From (25), we have:
∂t (b, β)
∂β
> 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
>
8π3
b (6π2 − b2) − 1 = ω
c
2 (b) ,
∂t (a, β)
∂β
> 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
>
8π3
a (6π2 − a2) − 1 = ω
c
2 (a) ,
∂t (b− a, β)
∂β
> 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
>
8π3
(b− a)
h
6π2 − (b− a)2
i − 1 = ωc2 (b− a) .
Since the peripheral region is by assumption small (a < b/2), we deduce that:
ωc2 (b) < ω
c
2 (b− a) < ωc2 (a) .
We consider now the sign of ∂w (.) /∂β in the diﬀerent political situations. Since trade openness has
to be approved by a simple majority and not by all inabitants of the country, we consider the critical indi-
vidual located in b/4 (or equivalently in 3b/4). Moreover, we define only suﬃcient conditions. A majority
of country inhabitants will be then in favor of free trade (respectively of autarky) if: ∂t (b, β) /∂β > 0 and
∂w (b, β; b/4) /∂β < 0 (respectively ∂t (b, β) /∂β < 0 and ∂w (b, β; b/4) /∂β > 0). If the political unity
remains, whatever is the trade openness, expression (19) yields to:
∂w
¡
b, g, β; b4
¢
∂β
< 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
>
64π3
b (48π2 − 7b2) − 1 ≡ ω
c
3 (b) .
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We note that: ωc2 (b) > ω
c
3 (b). We deduce that:
ωd
ωe
> ωc2 (b) > ω
c
3 (b)⇒ ∀x ∈
∙
0,
b
4
¸
∪
∙
3b
4
, b
¸
,
∂U (b, g, β;x)
∂β
< 0,
ωd
ωe
< ωc3 (b) < ω
c
2 (b)⇒ ∀x ∈
∙
0,
b
4
¸
∪
∙
3b
4
, b
¸
,
∂U (b, g, β;x)
∂β
> 0.
The symmetry of the utility funtion vanishes in case of secession. However, since we are only looking for
suﬃcient conditions, we consider separately the same two individuals located at b/4 and at 3b/4. We
focus first on the individual in b/4. We have two cases depending whether she leaves in the peripheral
region or not (b/4 ≶ a). From (19), we deduce that:
If b/4 < a,
∂w
¡
a, β; b4
¢
∂β
< 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
<
64π3
a (48π2 − 16a2 + 12ab− 3b2) − 1 ≡ ω
c
31 (a, b) .
If b/4 > a, (19) translates into:
∂w
¡
b− a, β; b4
¢
∂β
< 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
<
64π3
(b− a) (48π2 − 16a2 − 4ab− 7b2) − 1 ≡ ω
c
32 (a, b)
Considering the individual located at 3b/4, we know that she does not leave in the secessionist region.
So, we have:
∂w
¡
b− a, β; 3b4
¢
∂β
< 0⇐⇒ ω
d
ωe
<
64π3
(b− a) (48π2 − 16a2 + 20ab− 7b2) − 1 ≡ ω
c
33 (a, b)
Simple comparisons yield to establish that:
ωc2 (a) = max
½
ωc2 (b) , ωc2 (b− a) , ωc2 (a) ,
ωc3 (b) , ω
c
31 (a, b) , ω
c
32 (a, b) , ω
c
33 (a, b)
¾
ωc3 (b) = min
½
ωc2 (b) , ωc2 (b− a) , ωc2 (a) ,
ωc3 (b) , ω
c
31 (a, b) , ω
c
32 (a, b) , ω
c
33 (a, b)
¾
Thus, we deduce Proposition 1:
ωd
ωe
> ωc2 (a) , max
½
∂U (a, g, β;x)
∂β
,
∂U (b, g, β;x)
∂β
¾
> 0,
ωd
ωe
< ωc3 (b) , max
½
∂U (a, g, β;x)
∂β
,
∂U (b, g, β;x)
∂β
¾
< 0.
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A.4 Graphics
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Figure 1. World representation
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Utility level b=5 πccccccccc6
x=0
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x=a+bccccccccccc2
x=b
Utility levels for four specific individuals (a = b/3, ωd = 1, ωe = 1.2, g = 3).
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Utility levels at four specific degree of openness (b = π/2, a = π/6, ωd = 1, ωe = 2, g = 3).
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